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IN THE UTAH UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
Case No. 20060328-CA

vs.
JOHN ANGELO GARCIA,
Defendant/Appellee.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

ARGUMENT
I.

THE RECORD DEMONSTRATES—AND DEFENDANT DID
NOT DISPUTE BELOW—THAT POLICE LAWFULLY
ENTERED THE APARTMENT AT WHICH POINT THEY
SMELLED BURNT MARIJUANA AND WITNESSED
MARIJUANA AND PARAPHERNALIA IN PLAIN VIEW.

Somewhat oddly, defendant spends much time and effort attacking the most obviously
appropriate and lawful aspects of the search—the officers' attempt to investigate a reported
robbery and their entry into the apartment where they were immediately exposed to telltale
signs of drug use, e.g., the smell of burnt marijuana as well as baggies of marijuana and
paraphernalia in plain view. "[I]n this case the prosecutor presented no facts to support, and
no argument regarding, the officers' initial warrantless search of items in the apartment in
plain view or otherwise." Aple. Br. at 21-22. This claim is plainly wrong.

A.

Defendant Did Not Challenge the Officer's Entry into the
Apartment, Which Was Clearly Justified As Part of Their
Investigation of a Reported Robbery and the Suspicious Actions of
the Two Men with the Duffle Bag.

Defendant claims on appeal the police officers' entry into the home was "unlawful."
Aple. Br. at 18. "Since the challenge in the motion to suppress related to the initial
warrantless search (see R. 61-63; 107:12-14), it was incumbent upon the state to establish
that it was lawful." Aple. Br. at 21.
This claim fails because the motion to suppress did not challenge the initial
warrantless entry into the apartment. Instead, the exclusive focus of defendant's twoparagraph argument was the propriety of the search of the duffle bag. See, e.g., R. 62-63.
Although at the suppression hearing, defendant's counsel belatedly asserted that there was
"reason to suggest that the entry itself into the home was unlawful," he acknowledged that he
was not prepared and was unable to offer any evidence suggesting that the officers' entry
into the home was anything but lawful. R. 107:13-14. Thus, defendant has failed to create
any genuine hurdle for the State to overcome concerning the initial entry into the apartment.
But even crediting defendant's meager challenge to the initial entry as something
more than an afterthought, there is nonetheless ample record support for police actions. The
Search Affidavit, R. 73-75 and State's Exhibit 1, which was cited at page 14 of the State's
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Opening Brief, l makes the justifications for police entry into the apartment abundantly
clear—so clear, in fact, that defendant never offered any evidence or authority to the trial
court to suggest that the entry was unlawful. The Search Affidavit states:
On the evening of October 11,2005 Salt Lake City Police Officers responded
to the listed apartment on a possible robbery in progress call. The female
complain[an]t was at the listed address in apartment A. Apartment A is below
apartment C. She said that she heard people upstairs in the above apartment.
She then saw three males leaving apartment C and running away. One of [the]
males was wearing a ski mask. When Police Officers arrived a short time
later, they heard yelling coming from the listed apartment. The Officers then
saw a male adult coming out of the listed apartment. He was wearing a
stocking cap and carrying a duffel bag. Police Officer[s] challenged the male
and he ran back into the apartment. Police Officers knocked on the apartment
door and the persons inside said everything is ok but they would not open the
door. Police Officers then observed the male who was carrying the duffel bag
go out the back door onto a balcony. Someone from inside the apartment
handed the male the duffel bag. Police Officers challenge[d] the male again.
The male dropped the duffel bag and went back into the apartment. Police
Officer told the persons inside the apartment that they needed to come in and
verify that everything is ok. Officers told the persons in the apartment to open
the door or they would kick it in. The persons inside the apartment then let the
police into the apartment.
The Police Officers who went into the apartment could smell a strong smell of
fresh burnt marijuana in the apartment. They observed a small baggie of a
green leafy substance in plain view on a couch. Officers found that duffel bag
the male dropped on the balcony contained large amounts of a green leafy
substance that appears to be marijuana. The Officers also observed that a

1

In his opposing brief, page 32, defendant claims that the State is improperly
attempting to assert on appeal, "without reference to the record," that police had reasonable
suspicion to enter the apartment. This claim is puzzling given that the State's Opening Brief
explicitly cites to record, specifically the Affidavit for Search Warrant, signed by Detective
Doug Teerlink and dated October 12,2005 ("Search Affidavit"), R. 74, where Det. Teerlink
recounts the reported robbery and the suspicious behavior of the two men with the duffle
bag.
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mirror had been knocked off the wall near the balcony and some money
hidden behind it.
R. 74. The Search Affidavit was received into evidence without objection from defendant.
R. 107:11. Because the factual and legal bases for the officers' entry into the apartment were
never challenged below, and because the officers' concerns about the reported robbery and
the suspicious behavior of the men with the duffle bag were so obviously reasonable,
defendant cannot now claim the entry was unlawful. See generally Warden, Md. Penitentiary
v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967) (finding warrantless entry into home justified by
exigent circumstances where witnesses told officers that suspect ran into the residence less
than five minutes before the officers' arrival).
B.

Once Inside the Apartment, Police Officers Were Justified in
Investigating Clear Indications of Drug Use—The "Plain Smell" of
Burnt Marijuana and the Existence of Paraphernalia and Baggies
of Marijuana in "Plain View."

Defendant seems to think that the officers' initial entry into the apartment, their
immediate awareness of the plain smell of marijuana and their observation of baggies of
marijuana and paraphernalia in plain view was a "warrantless search." It was not. As the
Utah Supreme Court has stated, "observations by law enforcement of activity in 'open view5
from a position 'lawfully accessible to the public' do not infringe upon an individual's
'reasonable expectation of privacy,' and thus do not constitute a search under the Fourth
Amendment." Salt Lake City v. Roberts, 2002 UT 30, ^ 24,44 P.3d 767 (citing State v. Lee,
633 P.2d 48, 51 (Utah 1981)) (emphasis added); see also LaFave, Wayne R, Search and
Seizure: A Treatise On The Fourth Amendment, § 2.2 (4th ed. 2004) ("As a general
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proposition, it is fair to say that when a law enforcement officer is able to detect something
by utilization of one or more of his senses while lawfully present at the vantage point where
those senses are used, that detection does not constitute a 'search5 within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment"). The officers demanded and were eventually granted entry into the
home to investigate a possible robbery—a possibility that was bolstered by the furtive and
evasive actions of the men with the duffle bag. Defendant has never disputed the officers'
account or presented any evidence to suggest that the officers' actions were not justified.
The record clearly establishes that the officers made their plain view/smell observations from
a lawful vantage point and no further justification, legal or factual, is required.
II.

THE STATE PRESERVED ITS FRANKS CLAIM BY ARGUING
TO THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE SEARCH AFFIDAVIT
WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT PROBABLE CAUSE EVEN
WITHOUT THE EVIDENCE FROM THE DUFFLE BAG.

Defendant claims that "the [S]tate has raised the Franks doctrine here for the first
time on appeal." Aple. Br. at 23 (citing Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978)). Thus,
according to defendant, the State may argue Franks on appeal only by showing plain error or
exceptional circumstances. Id. at 24. Because the State has not claimed plain error or
exceptional circumstances, the argument goes, its Franks argument cannot succeed. Id.
Here, defendant makes what is essentially a semantic point. It is true that the State's
briefing before the trial court did not include an explicit reference to "the Franks doctrine."
However, the State clearly invoked the Franks remedy when it argued that "there was
probable cause for a warrant even without the information describing the contents of the
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duffel bag" and "even if this court were to hold that the search of the duffel bag could not be
used as a basis for the probable cause, the remaining information in the affidavit provides
probable cause on which to issue a warrant." R. 68-69. This prosecutor's request that the
court review the affidavit without the offending information describes precisely what the trial
court was authorized to do and should have done under Franks and its progeny after it
determined that the marijuana discovered in the duffle bag had to be suppressed. As argued
in the State's Opening Brief, "when faced with a warrant containing information obtained
pursuant to an illegal search, a reviewing court must excise the offending information and
evaluate whether what remains is sufficient to establish probable cause." United States v.
Dessesaure, 429 F.3d 359, 367 (1 st Cir. 2006) (discussing Franks requirements in light of
Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533 (1988)).
Defendant also claims that there was no basis for redacting the affidavit under Franks
because the State did not allege that it contained false information. Aple. Br. at 24. In
Franks, the United States Supreme Court held that a search warrant that is based on
"deliberate falsehoods" or a "reckless disregard of the truth" must be evaluated to determine
if it still supports probable cause once the false information is removed. Franks, 438 U.S at
171-72. According to defendant, because there was no claim that the Search Affidavit
contained "deliberate falsehoods" or a "reckless disregard for the truth," Franks is
inapplicable.
But defendant confuses the Franks holding with what has evolved through subsequent
caselaw into what is now called "the Franks doctrine" or "the Franks remedy." The Franks

6

remedy, unlike the more narrow Franks holding, endorses a procedure through which a court
determines whether an affidavit still supports probable cause once information concerning
illegally obtained evidence is removed. See State's Opening Br. at 12-13 (citing, numerous
cases from various jurisdictions discussing the "Franks doctrine" as a means of redacting
information concerning illegally obtained evidence). Thus, the Search Affidavit need not
contain false information to be eligible for the Franks remedy. On the contrary, the State has
argued that the trial court should have excised statements concerning the marijuana in the
duffle bag—statements that were entirely truthful and accurate—and then determined
whether the redacted warrant was sufficient to support probable cause.
In sum, the State raised the Franks doctrine in its explicit request that the trial court
determine whether the Search Affidavit still supported probable cause when the information
concerning the 32 pounds of marijuana from the duffle bag was redacted. Had the court
done so, it would have or at least should have found that the affidavit was sufficient and
denied defendant's motion to suppress.
III.

DEFENDANT MISCONSTRUES THE STATE'S USE OF
RELEVANT AUTHORITY AS BACKGROUND TO EXPLAIN
THE RATIONALE FOR THE FRANKS DOCTRINE AND ITS
APPLICABILITY IN THIS CASE.

In his brief, defendant spends several pages critiquing the applicability of "inevitable
discovery rule" and the "the independent source rule," ultimately concluding that neither has
any applicability in this case." Aple. Br. at 26-31. Unfortunately, this analysis is completely
superfluous because the State did not suggest that those doctrines were applicable to this
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case. In fact, the State never mentions the inevitable discovery rule and refers to independent
source only once in a parenthetical.
Defendant incorrectly infers that the State was invoking the inevitable discovery rule
through citation to Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984). See Aple. Br. at 26. It is true that
Nix sanctions the admissibility of otherwise suppressible evidence "if the prosecution can
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably
would have been discovered by lawful means." Id. at 444. However, the State did not cite
Nix to support or advocate application of the inevitable discovery rule in this case. Rather,
the State refers to M r only to introduce the Franks doctrine by explaining the general
rationale for admitting otherwise tainted evidence where suppression "would operate to
undermine the adversary system by putting the State in a worse position than it would have
occupied without any police misconduct." See State's Opening Br. at 11-12 (citingNix, 567
U.S. at 447). Here, the State advocates the application of Franks to put the police in the
same position they would have been if they had not opened the duffle bag—i.e., in
possession of plain smell and plain view evidence of marijuana use and possession which
was sufficient to support probable cause for a warrant. Because the trial court erroneously
failed to make that determination, this Court should at minimum remand for further
proceedings.
Next, defendant turns to the independent source doctrine. Here, again, defendant
faults the State for not properly briefing an issue it did not raise. Aple. Br. at 30-31. The
State is not asking this Court to determine whether the 32 pounds of marijuana would
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ultimately be deemed admissible under the independent source doctrine. Rather, the State is
arguing that it is entitled to a determination by the trial court as to whether the redacted
Search Affidavit supported probable cause for the search. See State's Opening Br. at 13-14.
The trial court erred in failing to do so. This error requires reversal or, at minimum, remand
to the trial court for consideration of whether the redacted warrant is valid.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully that this Court reverse the trial
court's suppression of the evidence of 32 pounds of marijuana found in the duffle bag.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 8th day of March, 2007.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

1CL04 £ . Q j 2 ^ £ r
BRETT J. DELPORTO
Assistant Attorney General
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